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extends this account of human creative agency to show that although it
resembles God’s creative capacity, it crucially differs in that the novelty
(of art, literature, invention, meanings, etc.) necessarily emerges from
human interaction with pre-existing materials, whereas God’s creative
capacity is entirely self-sufficient, requiring God’s will alone. In their logical dependence upon his modal theory, both Robson’s characterization of
human freedom and his account of human creativity inherit its deficits as
articulated above. Nevertheless, this is an engaging and highly original
work that merits the serious consideration of anyone with a theological
interest in the metaphysics of modality.

The End of Philosophy of Religion, by Nick Trakakis. Continuum, 2008. Pp.
viii + 172. $120 (cloth).
VICTORIA S. HARRISON, University of Glasgow
The End of Philosophy of Religion is a book about philosophy and its practitioners. At its core lies a sobering evaluation of the current state of analytic
philosophy. Describing this form of intellectual activity as “monotonous,”
“mournful,” and “melancholic,” Trakakis clearly believes that it has outlived its usefulness (1). In keeping with this view, the current resurgence
of interest in analytic philosophy in many parts of the world is dismissed
as akin to the “long twilight of piety and nihilism” which Nietzsche predicted would follow the death of God (1).
As Trakakis explains in chapter 1, the type of philosophy whose demise
he celebrates is modeled on the natural sciences. He argues that its core problem is that, unlike the objects of natural science, the objects of philosophical inquiry are not, and never could be, rationally comprehensible. Thus,
allowing the model of natural science to shape the practice of philosophy
has led to a dead end. Trakakis compares the “endlessly futile attempts”
of analytic philosophers “to render everything rationally comprehensible”
to Ad Reinhardt’s preoccupation with painting black canvases (1). Just as
Reinhardt’s paintings were intended to symbolize the point at which no
further development in painting was possible, analytic philosophers have
reached the point at which they can make no further progress. The End of
Philosophy of Religion is a sustained attempt to persuade others to share this
view by focusing on a specific instance of this mootedly futile philosophical
enterprise, namely analytic philosophy of religion. Trakakis believes that
the failure of analytic philosophy is nowhere more apparent than in the
philosophy of religion, so he uses this sub-discipline to bring into sharper
focus his assessment of the analytic tradition as a whole.
Chapter 2 deploys the problem of evil, and the way it is typically handled by analytic philosophers of religion, to illustrate the malaise which
he believes afflicts the sub-discipline. I agree with Trakakis that writing
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on this topic can exemplify philosophy of religion at its worst. Many no
doubt come away from immersion in this literature with a deep sense of
philosophical and spiritual unease. Nevertheless, Trakakis’s use of this
example as evidence that there is “something fundamentally amiss in the
analytic approach to philosophy of religion” seems over-stretched (31).
But on the basis of this evidence Trakakis proceeds, in chapter 3, to an
insightful comparison between the analytic and Continental styles of philosophy of religion. The Continental style comes out rather more favorably
than the analytic, and the first section of chapter 4 showcases the work of
one of its foremost practitioners, John Caputo. Throughout this section,
as throughout the preceding chapter, Trakakis provides the uninitiated
with an admirably clear exposition of the Continental style of philosophy.
Chapter 4 is worth reading independently of its place within the book, as
it deftly explains the approach to the concept of God employed by analytic
philosophers, on the one hand, and that favored by Continental philosophers, on the other.
Although Trakakis is more sympathetic to the Continental tradition
than are many analytically-trained philosophers, he neither endorses
it out-right nor argues for a rapprochement between it and the analytic
tradition. Instead his argument follows a completely different trajectory,
taking a starting point from his conviction that the analytic/Continental
divide should be surmounted by “overcoming (traditional) philosophy
itself” (83). He further suggests that we should “kick the habit of philosophizing in the usual way. . . and thus move towards an inter-disciplinary,
or even non-disciplinary or non-academic, way of philosophizing” (83). In
chapter 5, Trakakis tries to flesh out this new conception of what it means
to philosophize by using as a model The Poor Man of God, a fictionalized
biography of St. Francis of Assisi by Nikos Kazantzakis, known in some
translations as God’s Pauper.
I share Trakakis’s enthusiasm for The Poor Man of God. In fact, I have read
this book every year without fail since discovering it as a philosophy undergraduate. This shared enthusiasm notwithstanding, I found Trakakis’s
proposal that we use Kazantzakis’s writings as a paradigm for a new way
of practicing philosophy of religion puzzling. In fact, I have to confess that
chapter 5 left me in the dark about what exactly Trakakis was proposing
as the way forward for philosophers of religion. Of course, they could give
up writing analytic philosophy (an activity which Trakakis himself does
very well) and instead focus their literary skills on poetry or fiction. But
it isn’t clear to me in what sense their literary productions would then be
philosophy rather than merely philosophical.
Trakakis holds out the prospect of fresh philosophical insights to be
gleaned from narrative and literary approaches to religion, but he nowhere tells us what any of these insights might be. One is left wondering
exactly what of philosophical interest is to be gleaned from the discussion of The Poor Man of God. The inspirational portrayal of St. Francis may
well lead one to imagine philosophers of religion abandoning universities
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and running to the hills in search of a more vivid encounter with God. Of
course, philosophers could do that (although some might settle for the
tamer option of an annual retreat), but in what sense does Trakakis think
that if they do they are thereby practicing philosophy of religion? They
may well be putting their philosophy into practice, as Trakakis suggests,
but that doesn’t seem to be equivalent to practicing philosophy.
This search for new sources of insight is clearly fuelled by a not entirely
unreasonable dissatisfaction with the currently available ones. Trakakis is
disappointed by what he describes as “the disconnection between life and
thought, between the lived praxis of faith and the philosophical pursuit
of wisdom” that he finds in professional analytic philosophy of religion
(2). He worries that philosophy of religion just isn’t personal enough. Philosophers of religion are not engaged in their philosophizing to the extent
that it is allowed to have an impact on their spiritual lives. My sense is that
Trakakis expects both too much and too little from analytic philosophy of
religion. He expects too little because he underestimates the advantages
of the impersonal nature of the analytic approach. If there is any area of
human concern that badly needs the kind of impersonal objectivity offered by analytic philosophy, it is surely religion. This is by no means to
suggest that one should rely exclusively on analytic philosophy for one’s
understanding and evaluation of religion. The other sources of insight
Trakakis discusses could be regarded as complementary to the analytic
approach. One could even concede that they are necessary for a fuller appreciation of religion. But they cannot give us what analytic philosophy of
religion, at its best, provides. Religion is prone to evoke highly emotional
responses, either in its favor or against it, or in favor of one of its forms
but against others. By providing a neutral language with which to discuss
religious belief and commitment, analytic philosophy can take us beyond
the highly emotional discourse characteristic of discussions of religion in
the public domain.
In the concluding chapter, Trakakis reaches for the last nails to seal the
coffin of traditional philosophy as he turns from a critique of its method to
a critique of the way it is currently practiced. His target is the professionalization of philosophy within academic institutions. The argument is that
if we want to change the way that people philosophize then we need to
change the way that philosophers live. Having already considered more
adventurous possibilities, here Trakakis focuses on the, at first sight, more
mundane alternative of changing the institutions in which philosophy
is practiced. He argues that we should abolish our current institutional
practices; philosophy departments across the world should be closed.
Philosophers must be liberated from the institutional shackles imposed
by universities which are increasingly organized according to the latest
fashions of corporate management.
Trakakis is certainly not alone in his criticism of our educational institutions. Many philosophers complain about their institution’s managerial structures, as well as their workload and the little time it seems to
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leave for deep and sustained philosophical reflection. Many also share
Trakakis’s reservations concerning the various ways that have been devised to measure academic productivity and the quality of philosophical
research. But I suspect that few would join Trakakis in arguing that, in
response to these difficulties, philosophy should be removed from our
universities. He argues that leaving universities would not only free time
for the practice of philosophy, it would also remove philosophers from
“the personal and political dangers” they are exposed to through their
practice of analytic philosophy (1). We have already considered what
he regards as the personal danger, namely, the unhealthy separation of
life and thought. The political danger seems to be that philosophers in
academic institutions have to teach future “lawyers, accountants, doctors,
computer specialists and. . . scientists and engineers who can be recruited
to help build the state’s military defence system” (123). In light of the risk
that one’s former students might take up professions that cut against the
grain of one’s own ethical or political views, Trakakis holds that philosophers should not teach philosophy within academic institutions as they
are currently configured.
But surely it is vitally important to introduce philosophy to undergraduates who will become “lawyers, accountants, doctors, computer
specialists and. . . scientists and engineers.” Philosophers do a great public service by exposing such students to philosophical ways of thinking,
especially if these students are vulnerable to recruitment into politically or
ethically controversial professions. Teaching philosophy to undergraduates opens to them analytic ways of thinking and talking about vexing
ethical, political and religious questions, concerning which there is little
public agreement. Insofar as philosophers do this, they can enjoy an inherently civilizing effect on our shared public world. This effect will only be
diluted by the closure of philosophy departments worldwide. Trakakis’s
failure to see this is symptomatic of his low expectations of analytic philosophy and its practitioners.
The strength of this book lies in the serious meta-philosophical questions it raises about the nature of analytic philosophy and the institutional
context in which it is currently practiced. Whether or not one agrees with
Trakakis’s estimation of the futility of analytic philosophy in general and
of analytic philosophy of religion in particular, it would be unwise for
philosophers to ignore these questions. The book’s weakness is its failure
to deliver a compelling alternative to current practices. The extended discourse on The Poor Man of God seems to be offered in this spirit, but it fails
to satisfy. Nor is Trakakis’s proposed antidote to the professionalization
of the discipline enticing. Should we take seriously the idea that those
currently practicing analytic philosophy of religion should abandon their
university posts (and their property?) and take to the hills in emulation
of the poor man of God? It is not at all clear how taking philosophers
out of universities would constitute a new direction for philosophy. My
suspicion, though, is that whether or not to give up their university post
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will not be a question preying on the mind of many of Trakakis’s readers.
For those that do decide that they need more time for contemplation than
a university environment allows, there are plenty of empty rooms in the
monasteries of the world. Trakakis would no doubt object, though, that
swapping one institution for another is to miss the point of his argument.

Buddhism: A Christian Exploration and Appraisal, by Keith Yandell and
Harold Netland. InterVarsity Press, 2009. Pp. 230. $22.00 (paperback).
MARK D. LINVILLE, Clayton State University
G. K. Chesterton once observed that it was fashionable in his day to suppose that “Christianity and Buddhism are very much alike, especially
Buddhism.” Though he risked being found out of step with his times,
Chesterton went on not only to challenge the equivalence, but also to argue for the greater plausibility of Christian orthodoxy.
The authors of Buddhism: A Christian Exploration and Appraisal are at
similar risk. They describe their book as being a “part of a genre known
as interreligious polemics or interreligious apologetics,” which, they
note, “strikes many as inappropriate” (xv). A chief end of interreligious
dialogue by many students of religion is the promotion of mutual understanding and respect among adherents of the different world religions. To
many such readers, the very idea of urging reasons for thinking that the
religious beliefs of others may be false is anathema.
However, Yandell and Netland argue that it is more respectful of a
tradition to take its central truth claims seriously—and to engage them
as such—than it is to downplay the doctrinal differences that adherents
themselves regard as being of great significance. And they observe that
there is no necessary connection between thinking a religious belief false
and treating those who hold the belief in a manner that is inappropriate.
(One might add that thinking some religious doctrines false is a necessary
condition of thinking any of them true. To believe a thing is to believe it
to be true, and to believe it to be true entails thinking any and all contrary
beliefs false. If there is anything inappropriate about thinking any religious beliefs false, the only remedy would thus seem to be to refrain from
believing anything at all.)
Further, it is commonly asserted that, while exclusivism appears to be
a hallmark of Western religious traditions, such is not to be found in the
Asian traditions. The authors do much to dispel this notion—which seems
itself to be a hallmark of Western religious studies departments—noting
that there is a long tradition of interreligious polemic among the Asian
traditions themselves. This point is argued explicitly in the introduction
and amply illustrated in the ensuing discussion of the various schools of
Buddhism as they have encountered other traditions.

